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Anything but a story foretold: Multiple politics of resistance to the 
agrarian extractivist project in Guatemala 
Alberto Alonso-Fradejas 
Abstract 
Sugarcane and oil palm agribusinesses are in the vanguard of an emergent project of agrarian 
capitalism in Guatemala, which is defined here as a financialized and flexible type of agrarian 
extractivism. Meanwhile, Maya-Q´eqchi´ residents of the northern lowlands believe that the 
changes in the labor regime, land relations and the agro-ecosystem that the expansion of these 
agribusinesses has brought threatens their subsistence in multiple and unfamiliar ways. Indeed, 
growing difficulties in dealing with (vital) grievances is leading many, even those who initially 
welcomed the corporate sugarcane and oil palm plantations, to transform their unrest into a 
practice of resistance. Elaborating on what is presented here as a multiple politics perspective, 
this article discusses the nature and character of such contemporary political dynamics of 
agrarian change. The forms, strategies, and practices of the two main and most antagonistic 
repertoires of contention are explored here: the one in “defense of territory” and the one in the 
promotion of the “agrarian extractivist project”. The tensions across and within multiple 
corporate, state and social actors who are pushing for, resisting, complying with, or operating at 
the most violent margins of the agrarian extractivist project are also examined. By assessing 
continuities and ruptures between current and previous cycles of contention around the control 
of land, water and other natural resources, this article stresses the often-forgotten lesson about 
trajectories of agrarian change not being a story foretold, but the product of multiple and 
dynamic politics. 
Keywords: Flex crops and commodities; land relations; labor regime; agrarian extractivism; 
multiple politics; frames and repertories of contention; Guatemala. 
 
Introduction 
Questions around the political dynamics of agrarian change regained momentum from 
the mid-2000s onwards, with the growing financialization of the economy (Fine 2012) 
and nature (Lander 2011) in general, and of agriculture (Isakson 2014) and land 
(Fairbairn 2014) in particular. Financialization shapes, and is shaped by, convergent 
economic, energy, environmental and food crises in a world historic juncture in which 
rapidly growing economies like the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and 
South Africa) and Middle-Income Countries (MICs) display a high demand for large 
amounts of raw materials and food. In short, favorable politico-economic conditions 
have been at play to (re)invigorate international accumulation projects based on the 
control of land, water and related natural resources (hereinafter land resources).   
In the context of the many land resource-based accumulation projects spreading all over 
the country1, in 2008, the government of Guatemala considered the spectacular figure of 
 
1 Such as mining, oil extraction, commercial tree plantations, carbon trading, hydro-power generation, 
cattle ranching, high-end tourism and narco-traffic money laundering. All these accumulation projects 
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1,101,604 hectares, or thirty-seven per cent of the country’s total farmland, to be 
suitable for sugarcane and oil palm cultivation (Alonso‐Fradejas et al. 2011). These are 
not just any kind of tropical cash-crops but two important ‘flex crops’. That is, they 
have ‘multiple uses (food, feed, fuel, industrial material) that can be, or are thought to 
be, flexibly inter-changed’ (Borras et al. 2014, 2). According to Borras et al., flex crops 
and commodities are highly valued these days because they 
seem to deal with [the challenge of increasing price volatility in world markets] by 
reducing uncertainty in a single crop sector through diversification of the product 
portfolio, thereby enabling investors to better anticipate and more nimbly react to 
changing prices in either direction—e.g., to better exploit price spikes or to better 
withstand price shocks [in short] their multi-functionality helps to negate the purported 
trade-off between risk and yield on investments. (2014, 2, 7).  
Moreover, flex crops and commodities are better equipped to navigate regulatory 
constraints, and circumvent social opposition, thanks to their ‘flex policy narratives’ 
(Borras et al. 2014, 16), especially when displayed in a ‘discursive flexibility’ fashion. 
That is through ‘the ability to strategically switch among multiple legitimating 
discourses which construe the necessary meanings and representations to achieve an 
objective’ (Hunsberger and Alonso-Fradejas forthcoming). Indeed, legitimating 
narratives of the sugarcane and the oil palm agribusinesses spin around food and energy 
security, green energy generation and climate change mitigation, as well as economic 
development and even (rural) democratization. 
A few years before the government’s announcement, a group of agrarian, financial and 
industrial firms in the hands of a small-but-almighty post-colonial oligarchy (which 
occasionally allies with transnational investors and financiers) had already started taking 
control over large swaths of land for sugarcane and oil palm plantations. I stress the 
question of land control building on Borras et al.´s understanding of current land grabs 
as ‘grabbing the power to control land and other associated resources such as water in 
order to derive benefit from such control of resources […] control grabbing is inherently 
relational and political; it involves political power relations’ (2012, 851). Indeed, as 
Holt-Giménez (2008) argues in the case of open pit gold mining in the Guatemalan 
western highlands, the expansion of corporate sugarcane and oil palm plantations is 
restructuring rural territories2 in a deep and comprehensive way. I suggest the means 
for such territorial restructuring has to do with the two complementing strategies of 
expansion of the oil palm and the sugarcane agribusinesses. One is what Harvey (2003) 
named the ‘temporal deferment’ of their investment. Current high revenues pay for 
costly and long-term investments including land and (flexible) oil palm and sugarcane 
mills. The other strategy is the making of governable spaces to fit their investment. That 
is, influencing not only formal regulatory frameworks and institutions, but especially, 
 
shape, and are shaped by, increasing economic and logistical corridors, and mushrooming environmental 
enclosures (Alonso-Fradejas 2012). 
2 Understood as ‘spatial assemblages of power relations and identity strategies [signifying] the ‘bottom-
up’ spatial contexts for identity and cultural difference (or place) more than the ‘top-down’ connections 
between state and territory’ (Gregory et al. 2009: 745-746). 
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ideas, discourses and practices of multiple state, corporate and social actors, across 
different scales3 and places4, to accommodate their accumulation interests. This, in turn, 
entails at least two distinct and major fixes. On the one hand, a labor regime fix to 
reshape the ‘specific methods of mobilizing labor and organizing it in [capitalist 
agriculture] production, and their particular social, economic and political conditions’ 
(Bernstein 1988 31-32 in White et al. 2012, 622). This article discusses the ways in 
which flex crop agribusinesses are reducing local wage work opportunities, while 
enforcing a community-detached, flexible and hyper-commodified labor regime which 
does not allow workers to make ends meet. There is, on the other hand, a land “good 
governance” fix performing ‘as a persuasive ethical power that allows for self-
regulation, making it possible for governments to intervene less intrusively and more 
efficiently’ (O’Laughlin 2008:946). This implies the production of a durable consensus 
around a particular rationality of governing land resources, which not only meets the 
agribusinesses’ interests, but is also perceived as desirable by concerned state and social 
actors. This land good governance fix is rooted in the freehold land tenure imperative, 
which has been spread since the early 1990s through IFAD- and World Bank-promoted 
Market-Led Agrarian Reform. As we shall see, the workings towards the labor regime 
and land good governance fixes do not just involve the use of physical force and 
violence, but also, and increasingly, that of different means of enticement and of 
economic and legal coercion which are ‘involved in the governance of conduct and, a 
fortiori, in the production of hegemony’ (Jessop 2010, 342). 
Current sugarcane and oil palm agribusiness accumulation and governmental projects 
are the main vectors and expressions of what I consider to be an emergent but major 
transformation in agrarian capitalism in Guatemala, and arguably in other similar 
national contexts in Latin America and elsewhere. Clearly, capitalist social relations of 
production were already dominant long before the beginning of the 21st Century, though 
unevenly internalized across traditional landed upper classes, peasant classes and rural 
laborers (see the seminal works of Martínez Peláez 1976, Figueroa Ibarra 1980, Handy 
1984, and Hurtado 2008 among others). Nonetheless, I suggest that from the mid-2000s 
onwards a distinctive project of agrarian capitalism is emerging in Guatemala, which 
could be aptly described as a financialized and flexible type of agrarian extractivism.  
In short, there are three main and convergent dynamics at play in the Guatemalan 
countryside informing this work-in-progress analysis5. Firstly, agricultural production in 
 
3 Comprising ‘the nested (and sometimes not so nested) hierarchy of bounded spaces of differing size’ 
(Jessop 2007: 104,105).  
4 Broadly understood as a ‘unit of space that has discrete boundaries, shared internal characteristics, and 
that changes over time and interacts with other similar units’ (Gregory et al. 2009: 539) 
5 This preliminary argument for, and understanding of, an emergent agrarian extractivist project is 
inspired by the reflection on my empirical research in the Guatemalan countryside since 2003 in the light 
of two main analytical threads. On one side, the classic agrarian question posed by Marx (1974[1867]) 
and further developed by Engels (1970[1894]), Kautsky (1988[1899]) and Lenin (1964[1899]). 
Particularly, the later discussion by Byres (1991, 1996) and Bernstein (2004, 2006) about the need revisit 
the classic agrarian question(s) in the socially diverse contexts of the South today. On the other side, the 
vivid debate on the politics of ‘neo-extractivism’, around mining and hydrocarbons extraction projects in 
Latin American states with progressive governments (Gudynas 2009, Veltmeyer and Petras 2014, Acosta 
2013, Bebbington 2007, Leff 2006, and Martínez-Alier 2002 among others). Especially, the need to 
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commercial sugarcane and oil palm plantations is being reshaped by the increasing use 
of new farming techniques, such as precision agriculture, and especially of highly 
versatile biotechnologies. Contrary to their promised outcomes, these technologies are 
increasing the already heavy dependency of modern agricultural production on 
petrochemicals and other costly inputs. In this search for ever-growing yields to 
maximize profit: i) the knowledge rift between traditional ways of farming and those 
relying on biotechnologies and information technologies is severed, excluding those 
producers unable to meet the required capital intensity, or reducing them to little more 
than lessors of landed-property and occasional labor (i.e., most contract farmers) (see 
Goodman et al. 1987, Netting 1993, and Altieri and Toledo 2011, among others); and ii) 
the metabolic rift between agricultural production and the ecosystem is pushed beyond 
the limit allowing for the biophysical reproduction of soil nutrients, underground fresh 
water sources and agro-biodiversity (see Mingorría et al. 2014, Moore 2011, IAASTD 
2009, Akram-Lodhi and Kay 2009, and Foster 2000, among others).  
Secondly, as mentioned earlier, the labor regime brought about by oil palm and 
sugarcane agribusinesses limits wage work opportunities without accommodating a 
living wage to most plantation workers (Hurtado and Sánchez 2011, Alonso-Fradejas et 
al. 2011). While labor and labor arrangements are flexibly organized to maximize 
surplus extraction, the working conditions are damaging workers’ physical and mental 
health in severe and even deadly ways (Hurtado and Sánchez 2011, Alonso-Fradejas et 
al. 2011). Indeed, somehow differently from the classic formulation of agricultural 
commodity production “freeing” labor from landed property towards a nascent 
industrialization, the flex-crops labor regime is freeing agricultural labor, but this is not 
being absorbed in any other productive realm of the economy. This “free” labor turns 
into a sort of expendable ‘relative surplus population’ (Marx 1974[1867]) with no, or 
little, prospects for either (self-)employment or state support (Li 2011). 
And, thirdly, as advanced by Bernstein in his review of the classic agrarian question in 
times of globalization, ‘the range of non-agrarian, non-indigenous sources of agrarian 
capital is likely to expand and diversify, and their significance to increase, over the 
history of capitalism’ (2006, 10). In today’s oil palm and sugarcane plantations, the 
surplus value and the land rent generated are no longer appropriated by local landed 
upper classes, nor subsidizing an industrialization project. They are instead, increasingly 
appropriated by financialized capitals exerting an increasing control throughout the flex 
commodity value chain(s), from production to transformation, fractionation for multiple 
uses, industrialization, shipping and retailing (see Fairbairn 2014, Isakson 2013, Solano 
2009, and Goodman et al. 1987, among others).  
I suggest, then, that engaging with the politics of the making of governable spaces to 
accommodate the agrarian extractivist project6 is a meaningful means to assess the 
political dynamics of contemporary agrarian change in Guatemala. Elaborating on 
 
contextualize this debate: 1) in contemporary accumulation projects in the realms of biomass in general, 
and agriculture in particular, and; 2) in non-progressive government Latin American states, like 
Guatemala.  
6 So far, I have approached agrarian extractivism as an accumulation and governmental project, which 
might or might not coalesce in a distinctive regime of accumulation within capitalism.  
5 
 
research since 20067 on the politics of sugarcane, and especially oil palm 
agribusinesses’ expansion in the Guatemalan northern lowlands (see figure 1 below), I 
will describe the broad contours of major economic, political and ideological 
distribution conflicts fuelling what could be well considered a new ‘cycle of 
contention’8 in the Guatemalan countryside. In so doing, I will elaborate on what I call a 
multiple politics perspective. This methodological approach is considered to be helpful 
in circumventing aprioristic and/or reductionist assessments of usually complex, 
dynamic and erratic politics of contention around land and natural resources control, in 
socially diverse, geographically and historically situated agroecological settings. 
Analytical attention is given to multiple state, corporate and social actors and to their 
fluid ideological and political positioning in time. This allows for an assessment of the 
nature and character of multiple and dynamic relations among such actors or, in other 
words, of the politics within the politics of contention.   
Nonetheless, the main interest in this collection is to focus on what Borras and Franco 
framed as the differentiated ‘political reactions “from below” - e.g. among groups of 
poor, vulnerable and marginalised people and peoples who are affected by large-scale 
land deals’ (2013, 1724). I will, therefore, attempt to put forward an initial discussion 
on why, how and whose dissent turns into a practice of resistance to changing labor and 
land control relations in the Guatemalan countryside. In doing so, I will discuss some of 
the politics between historically antagonistic forms of organizing agrarian production 
and of governing land resources (i.e. agrarian extractivism vs. indigenous-peasant 
farming), the politics across multiple actors resisting agrarian extractivism (e.g. 
grassroots groups and organizations vs. national militant peasant movements) and the 
politics within particular groups of actors in resistance (e.g. the indigenous “peasantry”). 
Beyond a series of conclusions regarding ruptures and continuities between current and 
previous cycles of contention, my main point here is one over which I claim no novelty, 
but believe to be worth stressing nonetheless: that trajectories of agrarian change are not 
a story foretold, but the product of multiple and dynamic politics. 
Q´eqchi´ lowlanders’ grievances about expanding oil palm and 
sugarcane agribusinesses 
The Guatemalan northern lowlands encompass almost half of the national territory and 
are mainly inhabited by the Maya-Q´eqchi´ peoples9 (hereinafter Q´eqchi´). It is in this 
agrarian frontier that the (1.6 million-hectare) Mayan Biosphere Reserve coexists with 
tens of thousands of indigenous cultivators supplying Guatemalan and Central 
 
7 Research methods include geographic information system analysis, interviews, participatory observation 
and a gender differentiated household survey carried out in October 2010. The survey’s sample was 
stratified by village (significance level 5 per cent) and included 294 randomly selected households (586 
surveys) in twenty villages of six municipalities within the northern lowlands (see figure 1). 
8 Understood by Tarrow as ‘less momentous than revolutions, more connected than contingent chains of 
events’ (2012: 215) 
9 The Q´eqchi´, with an estimated population of more than two million people is probably (since last 
official population census dates back to 2002) the largest of the 22 Mayan peoples in Guatemala.    
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American food markets, traditional coffee estates and cattle ranches, and more recently, 
sugarcane and oil palm agribusinesses. As mentioned, this article builds on research 
since 2006 in various villages from six municipalities within three distinct sub-regions 
of the northern lowlands depicted in figure 1 below. 
Figure 1: Research sub-regions, departments and municipalities in the Guatemalan 
northern lowlands region 
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Source: Author’s elaboration based on Government of Guatemala 2009. Scale: 1:3,000,000. 
The three sub-regions share a tropical climate, and an altitude of below 500 meters 
above sea level but show significant differences in their historical constitution. As 
Edelman and León (2012) remind us, putting changing social relations around land and 
agricultural production into a historical perspective is a sine qua non condition to 
assessing their character, and discussing their possible trajectories. At the risk of over-
simplification, since a fully-fledged historization of the three sub-regions goes beyond 
the scope of this article, I suggest two distinct processes of territorialization that 
characterize the social construction of the Polochic10 on the one hand, and South Petén 
and the Northern Transversal Strip11 on the other. The Polochic river valley fertile lands 
were first granted to German settlers, “white” Guatemalan oligarchs and government 
cronies by the national state in the 1870s, and they set about establishing large coffee 
estates. Q´eqchi´ families living in the area were incorporated into the estates under the 
colonato12 labor regime. As an in-between tenancy and bonded-labor arrangement, this 
 
10 See Wagner (2001), Grandin (2004) and Hurtado (2008).   
11 See Schwartz (1990), McCreery (1994), Castellanos (1996 [1985]) and Grandia (2012) among other 
relevant background sources. 
12 For a fresh review of the colonato regime in Guatemala see Hurtado (2008).  
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relation of production has many variants that evolved through time and place in 
Guatemala and elsewhere in Latin America. It generally combined wage labor with in-
kind or labor payments to the landlord (patron) in exchange of the colono family’s right 
to live and farm (only) self-sufficient crops in the patron’s hacienda. Families expelled 
from, or fleeing the haciendas, settled in the hilly lands surrounding the valley during 
the 20th Century. Other remained as colonos in the haciendas up until very recently. 
Further north, the agrarian colonization of Petén and the Northern Transversal Strip 
rainforests was sponsored by military regimes in compliance with the counter-
revolutionary land policies following the 1961 Alliance for Progress Initiative. Since 
then, thousands of families (especially Q´eqchi´) fleeing the colonato labor regime (e.g. 
in the Polochic) and/or the violence associated with the genocidal war13, arrived in these 
two sub-regions in search of farmland. Alongside this majority of landless and 
indigenous populations, “white” traditional large-scale landlords, small and medium-
sized “ladino”14 cattle ranchers, and government and military officials also arrived in 
South Petén and the Northern Transversal Strip during the second half of the twentieth 
century.   
It is within these milieus, where traditional haciendas and ranches coexist with capitalist 
agriculture and peasant farming, that the sugarcane and oil palm agribusinesses are 
harnessing control over land resources. That is, according to Ribot and Peluso, they are 
controlling ‘the ability to mediate others´ access’ (2003, 158). Control over access is 
just one amongst the three dynamics ‘constitutive of relations among actors in relation 
to resource appropriation, management or use’ (Ribot and Peluso 2003, 158); these are 
gaining, maintaining and controlling access to resources (Ribot and Peluso 2003). 
There were active land and labor markets in the northern lowlands long before the mid-
2000s. But it is since then, and in the context of renewed interests in land resource 
control for accumulation purposes as mentioned above, that the Market-Led Agrarian 
Reform (MLAR) and land titling programmes implemented by the state land fund 
(FONTIERRAS) rendered local land resources commodities of interest to capitalized 
“outsiders”. Crucially, this set the conditions for major changes in the social relations 
around land and around capitalist agricultural production, which ultimately became 
major sources of unrest among Q´eqchi´ lowlanders. These sources of unrest are 
intimately linked to a series of historically constituted and interrelated grievances of an 
agrarian, socio-ecological and ideologico-political nature, as well as to grievances 
related to the ‘terms of incorporation’15 into the emergent agrarian extractivist project. 
Agrarian grievances are related to directions of change in land control relations. Broadly 
speaking, there are two categories of landless people in the northern lowlands. The first, 
and larger one, is that of second and third generation descendants of the 1960s’ settlers. 
 
13 During the 36 years of war, and especially under the early 1980’s military-led scorched earth policy, 
there were also 160 massacres in these sub-regions. The 1996 Peace Agreements lead to the official end 
of a conflict which left 200,000 people killed or disappeared. Over 80 per cent of the victims were 
civilian, rural, Maya indigenous people (Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico 1999). 
14 This is akin to the mestizo racialized identity elsewhere in Latin America.    
15 Ranging from advantageous to adverse terms and conditions of people’s incorporation into an 
accumulation project (Du Toit 2004: 1003) 
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The second group comprises those who became landless in the context of expanding 
sugarcane and oil palm plantations. Eleven per cent of the families from the studied 
areas in the northern lowlands lost their land tenure rights between 2000 and 2010, 
mostly in order to give way to oil palm and sugarcane plantations (Alonso-Fradejas 
2012, 518). Indeed, the land use change analysis between 2005 and 2010, depicted in 
figure 2 below, shows that twenty-three per cent of the lands used for oil palm in 2010 
were previously used by small-scale cultivators to grow staples. 
Figure 2: Land uses in year 2005 of the land under oil palm cultivation in 2010. 
Guatemalan northern lowlands 
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38%
Food-crops 23%
Grazelands 10%
Traditional export
plantations  2%
Rainforest 27%
Wetlands 1%
Grasslands 38%
 
Source: Alonso-Fradejas et al. (2011) 
The land currently under the control of oil palm and sugarcane agribusinesses was 
privately titled by the state, with the result that corporate acquisitions could be 
considered as perfectly “legal”. As the manager of a leading oil palm company argues, 
‘land acquisitions, at least by us, have always been legal. If the transaction is legal I do 
not see any problem. We have the right to buy [...] When buying land, we must be sure 
there is not a single problem with the title’ (quoted in Hernández 2012, stress added). 
However, almost half of the surveyed male heads-of-household who lost their land, and 
were not working for an oil palm or a sugarcane company when surveyed, said they 
were compelled to sell their land. A third of them said they sold it because it was useless 
for farming, and the rest because they were highly indebted. Meanwhile, the meager 
payment most Q´eqchi´ peasant families received for their land did not allow them to 
develop alternative non-farming livelihoods, nor to regain access to farmland 
(Alonso‐Fradejas 2012, 519). 
Socio-ecological grievances are associated with changing land- and water-scapes. 
Figure 2 above shows that twenty-seven per cent of the lands used for oil palm in 2010 
were rainforests in 2005, whilst one per cent were wetlands, and thirty-eight per cent 
grasslands. Rivers are usually diverted to irrigate plantations and, together with other 
fresh water sources, have become contaminated with sugarcane mill vinasses, oil palm 
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mill effluents and different petro-chemicals (Alonso‐Fradejas et al. 2011). The 
expansion of flex crops is redrawing the land and water-scapes of fragile socio-
ecological systems and having a detrimental impact on these. 
There are also far-reaching ideologico-political grievances. As expressed by a middle-
aged Q´eqchi´ peasant man from the Sayaxché municipality,  
we, the Q´eqchi´, are facing a major problem. Our thinking is being dominated as well 
as our beliefs. This is the result of the way the powerful and rich people think. Of those 
who want to dispossess us from our lands once again. (Group meeting, March 2010) 
Indeed, many Q´eqchi´ lowlanders feel outraged at the fact that they are losing the land 
and autonomy they fought so hard for as swidden cultivators who settled as far as 
possible from estate patrons and state officials.  
Finally, the expansion of oil palm and sugarcane over lands previously dedicated to 
peasant and small-scale capitalist farming is eroding local wage labor opportunities 
because it is much less labor-intensive. As depicted in figure 3, oil palm and sugarcane 
require 52 and 36 working days per hectare/year respectively, while, for instance, the 
two annual maize harvests require 112 and chili cultivation 184 working days. 
Figure 3: Working Days per Ha/year in peasant farming, petty commodity production, 
sugarcane and oil palm (2009) 
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Source: Dürr (2011). “Maize/maize” refers to the two annual harvests of maize on that hectare of land.  
Besides, many of those incorporated into the agrarian extractivist project as plantation 
workers or small-scale outgrowers, feel they were adversely so. Firstly, piece-meal 
wages are common in plantation work, and do not cover even the basic food basket cost 
(Alonso-Fradejas et al. 2011). Working arrangements and conditions are flexible in time 
and space and outsourced via subcontracted crews, thus lack labor liability (Alonso-
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Fradejas et al. 2011). Furthermore, workers and people living nearby the plantations 
claim they are suffering from a series of accidents and maladies related to the forms of 
oil palm and sugarcane production. Machete cuts, sunstroke, dehydration, snake bites, 
gastrointestinal problems from polluted drinking-water, back, shoulders and wrist 
injuries due to lifting heavy oil palm fresh fruit bunches, and breathing problems due to 
the smoke from pre-harvest sugarcane field burning, amongst others, have been reported 
(Alonso-Fradejas et al. 2011). Most distinctively, a rare kidney disease is killing 
thousands of sugarcane cutters all over Central America (Sanders and Riordan Seville 
2012). In addition, fetal malformations are related to aerial agrochemical spraying 
(interview with the doctor in charge of Teleman (Panzós) public health posts, June 
2009) and increasing rates of venereal diseases to mushrooming brothels (interviews 
with representatives from AQT, Q´eqchi´ women organization, in Chisec, February 
2010, and from Mamá Maquín, in Fray, November 2013). Secondly, lack of technical 
assistance and access to enough credit, together with variable pricing and high quality 
and uniformity standards for the oil palm fresh fruit bunches delivered by small-scale 
outgrowers, are forcing many out of contract-farming, and even into landlessness. 
Within the emergent labor regime, Bernstein’s ‘agrarian question of labor’  becomes a 
central one: ‘what if the forms of capitalism, including industrialization […] in the 
South today are incapable of generating sufficient, and sufficiently secure, employment 
to provide ‘a living wage’ to the great majority?’ (2006, 13). 
Overall, these grievances are related to concrete issues that make it harder for many to 
make ends meet. Different groups of Q´eqchi´ lowlanders feel their ‘subsistence 
minimum’ (Scott 1976) is being violated. This feeling is enhanced by narrowing (or 
breaking) moral economic arrangements of inter-class reciprocity 
(Thompson 1971, Scott 1976). The moral economy relations which allowed for the 
continuous (re)negotiation of survival standards between (non-indigenous) traditional 
landed upper classes, capitalist farmers, and what are becoming fully-fledged Q´eqchi´ 
rural ‘classes of labor’16, are fading away. As argued by an elder Q´eqchi´ man and 
former landless movement organizer:   
Sometimes I wonder if we have advanced at all. As colonos in the estate the patron 
forced us to work for almost nothing. Still, we had a patch of land to grow our maize. If 
anything went wrong with the harvest, he would never let us starve. He looked after us 
because he needed us. Now we are free labor, they say. Free to starve, I say. The rich 
people do not need us and so do not care about us anymore (interview in Panzós 
municipality, November 2007). 
The previous statement is very telling of historically constituted subsistence levels 
among Q´eqchi´ lowlanders across different agricultural labor regimes. Elders often 
argue that even though patron-client relations under the colonato labor regime were 
exploitative and humiliating, they still allowed for the continuous renegotiation of the 
 
16 According to Bernstein, these include all those who ‘have to pursue their reproduction through 
insecure, oppressive and increasingly ‘informalised’ wage employment and/or a range of likewise 
precarious small-scale and insecure ‘informal sector’ (‘survival’) activity, including farming; in effect, 
various and complex combinations of employment and self-employment’ (2010: 73). 
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minimum requirements for the reproduction of the family. Even during the outbreak of 
neoliberalism in Guatemala (arguably from the mid-80s on) and throughout the phase of 
agrarian capitalism under neoliberal globalization, wage and working conditions of 
seasonal and/or occasional laborers were still based on similar (if not celebrated at least 
tolerated) moral economy arrangements. Things have changed from the mid-2000s on 
under the impersonal, hyper-commodified and precarious flexible labor regime enforced 
by oil palm and sugarcane agribusinesses. Wages, labor arrangements and conditions 
are standardized by absentee owners and inaccessible managers, so it has become far 
more difficult to negotiate subsistence minimums, compared with the past. In addition, 
multiple attributes in terms of class, gender, age and their manifold intersections, lead to 
multiple interpretations of what subsistence means, and where its minimum threshold 
lies. For instance, Q´eqchi´ food cultivators (landed or not, occasional laborers or 
otherwise) show not only higher expectations, but also higher satisfaction levels, 
regarding their reproduction needs in comparison to non-farming Q´eqchi´ laborers 
(Alonso‐Fradejas et al. 2011). Poorer Q´eqchi´ women tend to include access to 
drinking water, firewood, housing materials and medicinal plants, as minimum 
requirements for subsistence more often than less-poor women and men in general 
(Alonso‐Fradejas et al. 2011). Q´eqchi´ elders consider access to, and respect for, sacred 
places a must, while youngsters across genders and classes generally hold urban living 
standards in higher regard, and claim that access to information technologies is 
important for them. Despite the fact that grievances are experienced in different ways, 
growing difficulties in dealing with them are leading many to transform their unrest into 
a practice of resistance. 
Q´eqchi´ lowlanders’ resistance to expansion of sugarcane and oil palm 
agribusinesses 
Resistance can be approached as a complex and non-linear process of defiance, which 
often combines a messy group of practices of a material and ideational nature. Its 
capacity to sustain itself is contingent on multiple interventions and tensions between, 
across and within contenders in different scales and places. In engaging with situated 
practices of resistance of the Q´eqchi´ lowlanders, I will discuss the way they frame 
their unrest within and across communities and social groups, through ‘shared 
understandings and identities that justify, dignify and animate collective action’ 
(Tarrow 1998, 21). I will go on to describe the different forms and particular strategies 
of resistance to agribusiness expansion informing the Q´eqchi´ repertoire of contention. 
That is, ‘the ways people act together in pursuit of shared interests’ 
(Tilly 1995, in Tarrow 1998, 30) 
Resistance framed as defense of territory 
A synthetic review of the recent history of master frames of contention in rural 
Guatemala is useful to understand the way Q´eqchi´ lowlanders frame their struggles 
today. During the war (1962-1996), revolutionary uprising relied upon urban and 
(mainly) rural poor working classes-in-and-for-themselves. Indigenous peoples’ 
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demands were contingent upon the triumph of the revolution. National peasant 
organizations related in different but militant ways to guerilla groups and/or to Catholic 
Liberation Theologians, and framed their contention for a land-to-the-tiller land reform 
as part of the broader revolutionary struggle. Some of these organizations disappeared, 
but others remain active and will be addressed here as “militant” organizations, often 
with (inter)national scope.    
Neoliberalism was forged and enforced in Guatemala a decade before the Peace 
Agreements were fully signed in 1996. By then, outcomes of the Washington 
Consensus’ deregulation, liberalization and privatization imperatives were already a 
major cause of grievances across (rural) classes of labor. The 1992 National Peasant 
Congress echoed the problems related to unfavorable terms of (agricultural) trade and 
the dumping of cheap, subsidized corn from the USA. Nonetheless, after the bloodiest 
scorched-earth massacres were inflicted by the military during the eighties17, and 
popular expectations for the revolution’s success languished, militant peasant 
organizations and others framed their contention as a struggle for life (lucha por la vida) 
prioritizing the state’s respect for politico-civil rights. It was only after 1996 and in the 
context of deepening neoliberal globalization, that militant peasant organizations 
embraced food sovereignty18 as their master frame of contention against the TNC-
captured world agri-food system characteristic of the dominant food regime (Friedmann 
and McMichael 1989).  
On top of the exclusion of the (indigenous) peasantry from food, labor and credit 
markets, and the drastic reduction of public support for their forms of farming during 
agrarian capitalism under the orthodox neoliberal globalization period, from the mid-
2000s onwards they became also excluded from controlling the most productive land 
resources, as previously discussed. It is in this context that resistance to the emergent 
project of agrarian capitalism, which I am branding as agrarian extractivism, came to be 
framed as defense of territory. In essence, this is not a novel concept. The right of native 
peoples to territory was already enshrined in the ILO Convention 169 in 1989. It was 
further developed in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 2007. 
Notwithstanding its formal regulatory history, I suggest that it is only within the current 
cycle of contention in the Guatemalan countryside that a discourse on “territory” has 
been: i) appropriated by larger (other than the leaders of the national indigenous 
movement) and wider (other than Mayan indigenous peoples) grassroots constituencies. 
Indeed, a historically distinctive feature of defense of territory today has to do with its 
development and enactment from below. There are, of course, charismatic leaders and 
ideologues elaborating on the concept. But it is from the grassroots that such actors in 
particular, and (national) militant peasant organizations more generally, adopt this 
 
17 Rios Montt, one of the most influential Generals at the time, was convicted by a Guatemalan court for 
genocide and crimes against humanity on May 10, 2013. Ten days later, the Constitutional Court reversed 
the verdict. The case was still open during the writing of this article.   
18 See The Declaration of Nyéléni for a definition: http://www.nyeleni.org/IMG/pdf/DeclNyeleni-en.pdf 
For a critical discussion on the food sovereignty vision see the three special issues in the Journal of 
Peasant Studies (41:6 2014), Globalizations (forthcoming 2015) and Third World Quarterly (forthcoming 
2015).  
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master frame of contention; and ii) politicized via a strategically essentialized discourse 
on (collective) rights. As argued by an influential Q´eqchi´ ideologue (lawyer and 
Member of Congress) the ultimate goal of this frame of contention is to ‘move from 
practices of cultural resistance to the full exercise of collective rights in the territory’19.  
As we will see below, and contrary to what the etymology of “defense” may suggest, 
defense of territory entails defensive and oppositional practices as well as propositional 
ones, regarding strengthening “peoples’ sovereignty” over their life territories. Among 
other things, it could be argued that defense of territory aims to bring together two 
distinct, but intimately related, visions: One is a vision for a self-determined 
government of social relations of access, control, and use of land resources. 
Accordingly, ‘a government agency, an oil palm company or a conservation NGO needs 
to deal not with individuals but with a collective rights subject that is the indigenous 
community, via its particular institutions of government’20. The other is a territorialized 
vision of food sovereignty, to inform social relations around food production and 
distribution. Indeed, defense of territory for Q´eqchi´ lowlanders is rooted in their self-
representation as R’al Ch’och (Sons and Daughters of the Earth). This shared ethnic 
identity intertwines with one of a traditional sort of (self-sufficient) peasant class for 
itself (even if often no longer “in itself”) to dignify, encourage and justify Q´eqchi´ 
collective action in defense of territory.  
Q´eqchi´ lowlanders’ repertoire of contention in defense of territory 
Tilly understood the repertoire of contention as ‘the whole set of means that a group has 
for making claims of different kinds on different individuals or groups’ 
(1986, 4, in Tarrow 2012, 222). Q´eqchi´ lowlanders’ repertoire of contention in defense 
of territory is informed by corporate agents, government officials, national militant 
organizations and other allies of the indigenous-peasant movement. For Tarrow, social 
movements are ‘those sequences of contentious politics that are based on underlying 
social networks and resonant collective action frames, and which develop the capacity 
to maintain sustained challenges against powerful opponents’ (1998, 2). But as Tilly 
remarks, ‘social movements are a particular, historically discrete form of organizing 
contention and not the be-all and end-all of contentious politics’ 
(2004b, in Tarrow 2012, 222). Evidence from the northern lowlands suggests struggles 
in defense of territory are organized in both these ways, namely via more structured 
social movements and other relatively less structured forms. Hence, I will discuss now a 
constellation of resistance practices involving both overt-but-occasional structured 
forms, and surreptitious-but-ubiquitous everyday forms, as summarized in Figure 4 
below.  
 
19 In APROBASANK´s workshop in Guatemala City, June 26 2013 
20 In APROBASANK´s workshop in Guatemala City, June 26 2013 
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Figure 4: Forms, strategies and practices of the repertoire of contention in defense of 
territory
Everyday
• Lessen labor 
exploitation
• Erode the 
expansionary 
strategy of the 
agribusinesses
Structured
• Defensive
• Offensive
Repertoire 
of 
contention 
in defense 
of territory
Forms 
of contention
Strategies 
of contention
Practices 
of contention
1. Walk off 
plantation work
2. Foot-dragging 
1. Arsons in 
plantations 
2. Women concealing 
land title away 
from partners 
1. Strengthening 
communal government 
of land relations
2. Strengthening 
community livelihoods
1. Struggles for 
repossession
2. Struggles to gain 
access to land
3. Struggles for better 
terms of 
incorporation 
 
Source: Author’s elaboration 
Scott defined everyday forms of resistance as ‘the nearly permanent, continuous, daily 
strategies of subordinate rural classes under difficult conditions’ (1986, 22). In addition 
to frequent gossiping and grieving in trust networks, there are at least four other 
recurrent practices of everyday resistance to flex crop agribusinesses by Q´eqchi´ 
lowlanders. I have clustered them in two couples here. The first couple is particular to 
landless or occasional wage laborers. It is aimed at reducing exploitation in plantation 
work. One resistance practice here is walking off plantation work without prior notice or 
subsequent justification. Sometimes this becomes a group response either to unfulfilled 
promises by the agribusinesses (e.g. to support the community school) or to offences by 
foremen. There are, in fact, several cases where a community agreement stipulates not 
to work for a sugarcane/oil palm agribusiness. The other resistance practice is foot-
dragging and reporting more work than actually performed. In the municipalities of 
Ixcán and Chisec, though, foot-dragging turned into defiant sabotage during 2011 and 
2012. Full sacks of agro-chemical were buried instead of applied to oil palms. Drain 
canals were dug, but only next to the roads through which supervisors drove by, and not 
alongside the plantation. This almost led the main oil palm company in the area to face 
bankruptcy (interview with a small-scale oil palm outgrower, Chisec, July 2013). 
However, the company was refloated with new funding, and, in retaliation, local 
laborers are no longer hired.  
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The other couple of everyday practices of resistance is particular to the peasantry, and 
part of a strategy aimed at eroding the expansionary strategy of the agribusinesses. One 
resistance practice has to do with a wave of arsons. In 2007, dozens of oil palms caught 
fire in South Petén when cultivators burnt their fields in preparation for farming. When 
questioned by private security or the police, village members would associate such 
incidents with “unintended negligence”. Nonetheless, oil palm companies sued the 
owners of the plots from which the fire spread out, and asked for US$ 1,875 per burned 
oil palm21. This was considered to be terribly unfair by the peasants, who, in many 
cases, found no other option than to sell or give their land as in-kind payment to the 
company. Similar events took place in 2007 and 2008 in the Polochic Valley. The 
differences were that the maize cultivators were simply leasing the land; that both 
sugarcane and oil palm plantations were partially burnt; and payment to the 
agribusinesses was not in-kind, but as free labor. The other practice of resistance is 
carried out by Q´eqchi´ peasant women, and it involves them concealing land titles so 
their partners find it more difficult to sell the family plot. Indeed, 86 per cent of female 
heads-of-household within those households who sold their land between 2000 and 
2010, was openly opposed to the sale (Alonso‐Fradejas 2012, 519).  
Despite the fact that everyday forms of resistance by the rural poor are ubiquitous, Scott 
also argued how ‘at times of crisis or momentous political change may be 
complemented by other forms of struggle which are more opportune. [Everyday forms] 
are the stubborn bedrock upon which other forms of resistance may grow’ 
(1986, 22, stress added). Everyday forms of resistance in the northern lowlands are 
increasingly complemented by, or scaled-up towards, more structured forms of 
defiance. As of July 2012, the Guatemalan Secretariat of Agrarian Affairs reported 
‘1,214 cases of unresolved conflicts in the countryside (involving) 1,000,055 peasants 
claiming rights over 338,935 hectares of land’ (Prensa Libre September 4, 2012). 
Figure 5 below shows how 76.4 per cent of the different land conflicts reported by the 
Secretariat (not limited to those related to oil palm and sugarcane expansion) were 
concentrated in the northern lowlands region.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21 The official monthly minimum wage in Guatemala was of US$ 190 in 2007 (Alonso-Fradejas et al. 
2011: 45).  
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Figure 5: Geographical location of the 1,214 agrarian and environmental conflicts 
registered by the Government of Guatemala in 2012 
Sites of oil palm, 
sugarcane, mining, 
logging, oil
extraction, large
hydropower dams
and conservation
enclosures
Scale: 1:3,000,000 
 
Source: Based on Government of Guatemala (http://portal.saa.gob.gt/ accessed on July 25, 2012). 
Negative experiences with FONTIERRAS’ Market-Led Agrarian Reform and land 
titling programmes motivated many Q´eqchi´ lowlanders to move away from a 
“freehold land property route” towards securing private property rights over particular 
land plots, to a “defense of territory route” towards achieving juridical-political status as 
subjects of collective rights in their territory. Accordingly, Q´eqchi´ overt and structured 
struggles around land are no longer so much about securing land property rights, but 
about developing and strengthening their own abilities to control and use land as a 
means of production, and as territory. Structured forms of contention in defense of 
territory by Q´eqchi´ lowlanders include both defensive and offensive strategies. The 
former are aimed at developing and strengthening their abilities to maintain and control 
access to land resources. The latter seek to (re)gain access to land, and to improve the 
terms of incorporation into the agrarian extractivist project.  
Regarding the defensive, structured forms of contention, Q´eqchi´ ideologues and 
grassroots organizations alike, suggest that forcing the state to formally recognize 
communities as subjects of collective rights is a relatively simple ‘juridical juggling’22. 
Aware of the fact that law is neither self-interpreting nor self-implementing (Franco 
2008) they argue that the state’s recognition is of little use if not underpinned by strong 
grassroots organization and vibrant livelihoods. Hence, defensive strategies to maintain 
 
22 In APROBASANK’s workshop in Guatemala City, June 26 2013 
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and control access to land resources revolve around community self-determination in 
the ideologico-political and economic realms. There are ongoing initiatives to 
strengthen community-led systems of governing village politics in general, and the 
social relations around land, water and other natural resources in particular. One 
common practice of contention in this regard, is the refusal to give right of way through 
village lands to trucks, machinery or workers from sugarcane or oil palm 
agribusinesses. Many a time this is done in retaliation for similar practices carried out 
by the companies. Another recurrent practice to resist dispossession is that of counter-
ruling freehold land tenure. For example, a communal deed from a Sayaxché village 
states: ‘In the villages where companies are settled, people’s freedom is not 
respected…they privatize all that is indigenous people’s patrimony […] so we agree 
none of us will engage in any land deals with them’ (community deed number 19-2007). 
Other times, community members are prevented from leasing or lending farmland to 
those who had sold their land before to a rancher or to an agribusiness without a 
community-sanctioned reason, or without offering it first to other members. Similar 
practices include that of not accepting as a new community member anyone known to 
have voluntarily sold his/her land before, and that of expelling from the village anyone 
who challenges these rulings.  
Notwithstanding, counter-ruling freehold land tenure is rarely effective if the reasons for 
villagers with individual land titles to engage in land deals are not comprehensively 
addressed. Thus, there are, in addition, initiatives to strength community livelihoods. 
Most often, available livelihood options for rural Q´eqchi´ lowlanders revolve around 
farming. Freehold land tenure has contributed to the shift from a communal system of 
yearly allocation of farmland according to every family’s reproductive needs, to one in 
which the village lands became privately owned and “fixed” in time and space. As 
many as eight out of ten Q´eqchi´ families from the northern lowlands had to abandon 
an agro-ecologically, culturally, and socially sound23 swidden farming system for a 
more intensive one, suitable to the freehold land tenure regime. Agricultural 
intensification has usually been akin to increasing dependence on petro-chemical inputs. 
Evidence from socio-ecological metabolism analysis of Q´eqchi´ peasant households 
(Mingorría et al. 2014) and from sustained low external input agricultural practices 
(AVSF and APROBASANK 2011) show, however, that the means to higher yields in 
the karstic soils of the northern lowlands has little to do with a new Green Revolution 
miracle. Successful agricultural intensification has more to do with the ability of the 
family to divert higher amounts of labor towards a low external input-dependent 
intensification strategy. Becoming aware of this, and lacking support from decimated 
government extension agencies, groups of Q´eqchi´ lowlanders are being supported by 
their grassroots organizations, and a few committed (inter)national NGOs, to develop 
‘Campesino a Campesino’24 agroecological knowledge exchanges, on the one hand, and 
 
23 See Schwartz (1990), Grandia (2012) and Grünberg et al. (2012) among others.  
24 See Holt-Giménez (2006) for a compelling historization of this movement in Central America. 
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‘Peasant Markets’25 in search of more favorable terms of exchange and increased 
control over local food distribution and sales, on the other hand. Whilst both, 
‘Campesino a Campesino’ exchanges and ‘Peasant Markets’ are not necessarily “new”, 
they have been re-signified within this cycle of contention as means of struggle against 
the expansion of oil palm and sugarcane agribusinesses. This represents one of the 
multiple ways in which the food sovereignty frame informs, and contributes to, defense 
of territory (and vice versa).  
The offensive strategies within more structured forms of contention in defense of 
territory include struggles for repossession, for access to land resources, and for better 
terms of incorporation to the agrarian extractivist project. These are often 
confrontational struggles involving a wide range of Q´eqchi´ rural working classes. Two 
cases of struggles for repossession are worth describing here because of their particular 
character of “access without control”. The first one is that of a community from Fray 
municipality, which had its land officially titled in 1981, long before the FONTIERRAS 
Market-Led Agrarian Reform. Around 20 hectares of community land were seized by a 
large cattle rancher in the late 1990s, and since then community representatives have 
been complaining to FONTIERRAS about it. FONTIERRAS officials reassured them 
there was no need for concern because the land was titled in their name. In 2008 the 
cattle rancher became an out-grower for an oil palm company and planted the contested 
20 hectares with oil palm. Discouraged by government inaction, the community decided 
to occupy the plantation, chop-off the branches from the oil palms, and plant maize 
among them. In an interview in October 2009, company representatives claimed that 
‘the problem is between the community and the out-grower; we have nothing to do with 
it’. The conflict was not yet resolved by May 2014. The second case involves another 
oil palm company and a Q´eqchi´ village from Raxruhá municipality. In June 2012, the 
community council filed a petition to FONTIERRAS because 2.5 hectares of 
community land were seized by the company to establish an oil palm nursery. A 
freshwater creek supplying the village flows through the contested land, and villagers 
maintain the company polluted it with agrochemicals. In November 2012, the villagers 
decided to put pressure on FONTIERRAS and blocked the nearby national road. They 
allowed drivers to bypass the blockage only after they had carried two baby oil palms 
from the nursery and into the middle of the road. The company was forced to withdraw 
from the 2.5 hectares of land, but up until May 2014, villagers were still being harassed 
by the companies’ private security when fetching water from the creek.     
Notwithstanding other practices26, land occupations remain the most common way of 
gaining access to land resources beyond FONTIERRAS’ market mechanism. The most 
striking example in Guatemala’s recent history is the 2010 occupation of sugarcane 
plantations by around 800 landless Q´eqchi´ families in the Polochic Valley. It was here 
 
25 Ongoing successful examples include the weekly peasant markets in Chisec and Raxruhá where only 
direct producers can sell their produce 
26 Such as being granted access to communal land resources by the community council, or claiming land 
legally as an in-kind payment for unobserved wages and labor liabilities as former estate colonos 
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that, from 2005 onwards, an agribusiness purchased 5,400 hectares of land from 
traditional estates to move its sugar mill from the southern Pacific region to the 
Polochic. As mentioned, the Polochic Valley was basically inhabited by Q´eqchi´ 
families living under long-term colonato relations. Since 2002, most of these families 
were already negotiating with their patron the purchase of the estate’s land through 
FONTIERRAS. Negotiations dragged on due to FONTIERRAS’ bureaucratic 
procedures, and suddenly came to an end when the sugar mill arrived in the Polochic 
Valley. The offer of a higher price and immediate payment by the sugarcane 
agribusiness quickly convinced traditional estate owners to call an end to negotiations 
with their colonos. In retaliation, hundreds of landless Q´eqchi´ families from the valley 
and the surrounding hilly areas occupied fourteen estates in November 2010. Five 
months later, 1,500 soldiers and policemen, together with the company’s private 
security staff, evicted all families from the estates.  
Crops and houses were burned down and one Q´eqchi´ squatter was killed by the police. 
Two more would be assassinated later on by hitmen. In June 2011 the Inter-American 
Human Rights Commission called on the Guatemalan state to secure the life and food 
security of the evicted families. (Franco et al. 2012, 9) 
In October 2013, the President of Guatemala announced the allocation of a 3.5 hectares 
plot to every family. As of May 2014, less than 10% of the evicted families have been 
granted such land, and two of the estates were occupied once again. Nevertheless, the 
sugarcane mill was in full production. 
The third and last category of the offensive type of structured forms in defense of 
territory entails struggles for better terms of incorporation into the agrarian extractivist 
project, either as plantation workers, or as out-growers. On the one hand, and 
particularly in Sayaxché, where most farmland is under oil palm cultivation, Q´eqchi´ 
plantation workers have been struggling for increased wages and de-flexibilized labor 
arrangements and conditions. Following a major strike during 2012, a negotiating table 
was promoted by government representatives. Whenever negotiations became stuck, or 
the companies hired workers from other regions to put pressure on them, local workers 
would ban any truck with fresh oil palm fruit from accessing the mills. Some consider it 
to be a great success that every worker is now paid the official minimum wage, and 
carried to work in a bus instead of in cattle trucks (interview with the workers’ 
representative in the government negotiating table on November 2013). For others, 
mainly casual landed laborers, but also landless ones, these are not achievements, but 
just the minimal observance of basic labor rights (group meeting with village 
representatives from Sayaxché, November 2013). On the other hand, half of the 300 
small-scale oil palm outgrowers in Guatemala claimed, in a letter sent on December 
2013 to their contractor, that ‘the company promised oil palm cultivation was the way 
out of poverty. However, after four years of meager financial and technical support, 
together with increasingly unfavorable conditions of exchange, oil palm is rather 
leading us to bankruptcy and landlessness’. 
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All these forms, strategies and practices informing the repertoire of contention in 
defense of territory are relatively well-known among contending actors. Yet a 
distinctive feature from previous cycles of contention lies in the way this repertoire is 
activated nowadays. In fact, these practices of struggle are increasingly conceived not so 
much as an end, but as a means for strategic litigation processes. Strategic litigation 
involves grounded practices of resistance exerting pressure “from below”, together with 
politico-juridical advocacy “from above”, and support from research and social 
communication “from the sides”. This is why many Q´eqchi´ grassroots organizations 
and village representatives are working on alliance building with different actors within 
and beyond the local/territorial scales.   
Scaling up contention: the politics of alliance-building in defense of territory  
Becoming aware of the structural nature of their grievances, many Q´eqchi´ grassroots 
organizations, and entire communities, are willing to get involved in strategic litigation 
processes as a means to amplify their struggle in defense of territory. This requires 
forging tactical and strategic alliances. Q´eqchi´ lowlanders have found not many, but 
definitely diverse, allies. These include (inter)national militant rural social movement 
organizations, (inter)national development and human rights NGOs, alternative media 
networks, engaged researchers, some representatives of the Catholic Church, and even 
some progressive state actors. Among the latter, the “two doors policy” group of 
government officials stands out. Led by the Rural Development Bureau Secretariat, this 
group advocates for differentiated policy responses to peasant farming, and agrarian 
extractivism. They believe there are ‘intersections and possible complementarities 
among these agricultural development models’ (Minister of Food, Livestock and 
Agriculture27). Advocates of this viewpoint current are critical of both radical rural 
social movements and ultra-conservative oligarchs – a convenient positioning for those 
promoting an ‘extractivism committed to the rule of law and the green economy 
principles, with corporate social and environmental responsibility’ (Director of Strategic 
Policy, Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment28). 
An ally more committed to strategic litigation, though less influential within the state, is 
the mayor of Raxruhá municipality. He was sued in the Constitutional Court by the 
oligarchic Guatemalan Agricultural Chamber (Cámara del Agro) after trying to tax oil 
palm companies in order to ‘recover part of the huge expenses we have to pay to restore 
what they destroy and pollute’ (interview with Raxruhá mayor, August 2013). This 
move by the Agricultural Chamber, and the negative Court verdict in May 2014, 
radicalized the mayor and the other fifty-six auxiliary community mayors, who now 
demand that oil palm companies leave (assembly of Raxruhá village authorities, May 
2014).  
 
27 In “Conference on Agrarian and Rural Dynamics in 21st Century Guatemala”, October 11 2011, Rafael 
Landivar University, Guatemala 
28 In government’s “I National Congress on Racism and Discrimination”, August 7-9 2013, Guatemala  
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Notwithstanding, Q´eqchi´ lowlanders are linking more systematically with national 
militant peasant, indigenous, rural women and youth movements’ organizations29, and 
their allies. This is not an easy endeavor. Changing class configurations intersect with 
age, gender and kinship attributes, resulting in an increasingly complex range of 
positionings within and across Q´eqchi´ communities. This is not always read properly 
by militant peasant organizations, which can approach Q´eqchi´ villages as a tabula 
rasa of peasants struggling for autonomy (van der Ploeg 2010). This is part of the story, 
but definitely not the whole story. Militant cadres complain about ‘how hard it is to 
organize people to struggle for land reform’ (interview with a community organizer 
from a major militant peasant organization, October 2009) while village representatives 
claim sometimes that national organizations do not pay enough attention to local 
politics and the pace of struggle (group meeting with authorities from different villages, 
November 2013). Some grassroots organizations complain that national militant peasant 
organizations are still very much influenced by Socialist imaginaries, and do not take on 
board their particular claims as indigenous peoples (interview with a representative 
from an influential grassroots organization, October 2013). Indeed, Q´eqchi´ 
lowlanders’ demands in defense of territory are too “indigenist” for some peasant 
organizations, while their food sovereignty vision is too “peasantist” for some Pan-
Mayan indigenous organizations.  
Nonetheless, Q´eqchi´ grassroots groups are engaging more and more actively with, and 
many times even becoming part of, militant rural social movements (often linked to 
transnational activist networks) to scale-up their struggles in defense of territory. 
Conversely, Q´eqchi´ lowlanders’ place-based practices of resistance allow for the 
relocalization of national militant rural social movements. These where somehow 
detached from territorial practices of resistance from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s 
during their commitment to energy-consuming contention in the national and 
international arenas30. Place-based practices of resistance by the Q´eqchi´ (and others) 
in defense of territory are, indeed, reshaping from below the frames and repertoires of 
contention of national rural social movements. The “land-to-the-tiller” and “food 
sovereignty” frames are resignified within defense of territory. One example of this is 
“The Popular, Peasant, Women and Indigenous March” (La Marcha Indígena, 
Campesina, Popular y de Mujeres). Originally planned by evicted families in the 
Polochic Valley and a major national militant peasant organization as a nine-day march 
from Cobán to Guatemala City, it became a major political event. Some 15,000 people 
walked into the capital city on March 27, 2012 and handed petitions to the President and 
the Congress. The government agreed upon four points related to agrarian conflict 
resolution and stricter controls over private armed groups. President Pérez Molina stated 
that other demands like ‘cancelling the debt of hundreds of peasant groups with 
FONTIERRAS, a moratorium on development projects led by private investors, and the 
 
29 With few exceptions from the environmental justice side, alliances with environmental organizations 
have been difficult and rare, not to mention those with big international conservation NGOs. On the latter 
see Ybarra (2011) and Grandia (2012). 
30 I.e., struggling against the makings of the neoliberal food system at the World Trade Organization and 
around the negotiations of free trade agreements 
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withdrawal of new military detachments were signed with many reservations’ (Prensa 
Libre March 28, 2012). As for Congress, a deed was signed where representatives from 
most parties agreed on the fast-track approval of Initiative 4084 on the “Comprehensive 
Rural Development System Law”. Mostly unfulfilled so far, “The March” petitions 
illustrate a coordinated response to the strategies deployed by multiple actors working 
on the making of governable spaces to accommodate agrarian extractivism. 
Repertoire of contention in the promotion of the agrarian extractivist 
project 
Frames and repertoires of contention are critical arenas of struggle in themselves, which 
serve ‘just as easily for social control as for insurgency’ (Tarrow 1998, 202). In their 
making of governable spaces to advance agrarian extractivism, while at the same time 
countering struggles in defense of territory, corporate, state and social actors employ a 
repertoire of contention based in three mutually reinforcing strategies. One could be 
described as the Trojan horse31 strategy. Its aim is to divide and rule through enticement 
in the local/territorial scales, and its fundamental form of contention is of a discursive 
and symbolic nature. The second one is the pretty up strategy. This is intended to make 
the agribusinesses’ accumulation project seem to be one of socially responsible 
solutions to pressing ecological problems, across geographical scales. The pretty up 
strategy also relies on enticement, and its fundamental forms of contention are of a 
discursive and private regulatory nature. The third strategy is that of ruling by fiat. It 
involves ensuring an openly biased interpretation and implementation of statutory 
regulation towards particular (corporate) interests, be the only one that complies with 
the “rule of law” in everybody’s interests. This strategy has the double intention of 
securing what was accomplished through enticement and achieving through legal 
coercion and/or the use of physical force, what enticement could not. Its fundamental 
forms of contention are of a statutory regulatory and repressive nature. The character of 
these three strategies is schematically depicted in Figure 6 below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
31 I am thankful to SiuSue Mark for suggesting this formulation. 
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Figure 6: Strategies, forms and practices of the repertoire of contention in the promotion 
of the agrarian extractivist project  
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Actors pushing for agrarian extractivism are aware of the fact that consent and 
legitimation in the local/territorial scales today, are at least as important as in national 
and international ones. They are also clear that ‘beliefs, ideological controls and 
discursive practices, as well as negotiated systems of meaning, shape all forms of access 
[to resources]’ (Ribot and Peluso 2003, 168). That is why oil palm and sugarcane 
agribusinesses use the Trojan horse strategy to influence the ideological dispute around 
the symbolic power (Bourdieu 1989) underpinning dominant knowledge, beliefs and 
practices in Q´eqchi´ villages and communities. The agribusinesses’ Trojan horse is full 
of what people call “corporate coyotes”. These are locally recognized and charismatic 
subjects32, who are either hired occasionally, or directly employed by the companies. As 
argued by a group of dispossessed families from Sayaxché:  
They came to cheat us. “You better sell your land before it is flooded by the Puebla to 
Panama Plan hydroelectric mega-dams”, they said. “The companies will provide 
employment and welfare that the state cannot”, they also told us. And they were not 
people from faraway places, not even company lawyers or engineers. They were our 
brothers from neighboring villages! (Group meeting in March 2010).  
Corporate coyotes can therefore pervade communal institutions to counter dominant 
knowledge and imaginaries in the community, like those informing social relations 
 
32 They include preachers, teachers, doctors, NGO representatives, community leaders, local radio station 
announcers, traditional landlords/patrons, ranchers, village mayors, corn traders, civil servants, etc.    
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around land, water and other natural resources. They elaborate on class, gender, 
generational, or any other power cleavage available, to erode and reframe the 
community consensus. The coyotes understand that socially differentiated subsistence 
minimums lead to multiple positionings within and across communities. Broadly 
speaking, it is mainly Q´eqchi´ young, landless men who are often more enticed by the 
“fast monies” offered by sugarcane and oil palm agribusinesses. There are also 
youngsters who would rather farm or look for another type of wage work, and those 
who changed their mind after realizing that ‘money goes as fast as it comes and you 
have to work yourself into the ground in the plantation for it; it is just not a good deal’ 
(group interview with young Q´eqchi´ men from Sayaxché, June 2013). Conversely, 
Q´eqchi´ women across age groups, peasant and working classes are often the first to 
act against their partners’ or fathers’ will to engage in deals with the agribusinesses. As 
discussed before, women usually act individually and covertly, though they can also 
join forces to push through gendered hierarchies in community government bodies, and 
challenge corporate coyotes’ narratives.  
However, building a favorable consensus is just a part of the coyotes’ job. There is a 
need to ‘mobilize’ the new consensus (Tarrow 1998, 175) within and across community 
groups, so that social opposition is pre-empted, and people willingly33 engage in land, 
labor or out-growing deals with the agribusinesses. Furthermore, for this consensus to 
become fully hegemonic at the local/territorial scales it is necessary to go beyond 
peasant and rural working classes to include other relevant actors, such as local 
government officials, traditional landed upper classes, grassroots organizations and even 
different churches. For example, together with the small-scale oil palm outgrowers 
mentioned before, there are medium and large sugarcane and oil palm outgrowers who 
are anything but happy with their long-term contract-farming arrangements (interview 
with a large oil palm out-grower in Fray, December 2013). Some feel the agribusinesses 
are not supportive enough when problems arise, like the outgrower who was abandoned 
by the oil palm company in his 20 hectares land conflict with a “bordering” community 
in Fray municipality. Or, many owners of traditional large estates and ranches who 
refused to (or could not) join the flex crops bandwagon, feel socially displaced and 
negatively impacted by expanding plantations. Medium and large cattle ranchers 
complain their cattle get sick, often after drinking the water running through or by 
plantations under intense agrochemical inputs, or become stressed by the plague of flies 
around the mills (interviews with ranchers from the northern lowlands during 
2013/2014). 
The Trojan horse strategy is informed by, and an expression of, the pretty up strategy. 
The sugarcane, and especially the oil palm industries, are reframing their social image 
from simply another accumulation project to the ‘answer’ to food and energy insecurity, 
climate change, rural poverty and un-governability, just as it was defended by industry 
representatives from Guatemala, Honduras, Colombia and Ecuador during the First 
 
33 Indeed, the ideological dispute played out by corporate coyotes shapes all kind of decision-making 
processes, including Free Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) by “the community”. 
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Latin American Congress of Oil Palm Growers (October 17-18 2013, Antigua 
Guatemala). In fact, the oil palm industry wants to project itself as a “sustainable” and 
“responsible” type of answer to these problems. In prettying up agrarian extractivism as 
a socially responsible and ecologically sustainable project, what I call “sustainability 
gatekeepers” are of outstanding relevance. No matter whether intentionally or not they 
play a major role in resignifying oil palm from a hazard, to the best option for rural 
working classes and the environment. Sustainability gatekeepers are championed by big 
development and conservation (inter)national NGOs, but can also include universities 
and consultancy firms, which are part and parcel of corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) initiatives such as the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO), 
BONSUCRO, or the Roundtable on Sustainable Biomaterials (RSB). First, they bargain 
over the set of social and ecological standards particular to each initiative with the 
corporate actors involved. And then these sustainability gatekeepers are hired by the 
very same companies to evaluate whether they comply or not with those standards in 
order to be granted the “sustainability seal”. Both corporate coyotes and sustainability 
gatekeepers ‘coincide with the greater political power and have a hegemonic advantage 
[hence] a preeminent position in crafting emergent dominant traditions’ 
(Sivaramakrishnan 2005, 350). Indeed, via the “Guatemalan Sugar Producers 
Association” (ASAZGUA) and the “Oil Palm Growers Guild” (GREPALMA) these 
agribusinesses are well represented on the powerful “Guatemalan Agricultural 
Chamber” and from there, on the almighty “Coordinating Committee of Agricultural, 
Commercial, Industrial, and Financial Associations” (CACIF). Whilst there are various 
others, CACIF is the main ideologue prettying up agrarian extractivism as the socially 
responsible and environmentally sustainable “national development” project. 
Yet, when enticement and CSR strategies fall short, there is always the possibility to 
rule by fiat. As argued by Li, ‘more authoritarian forms of government are often 
reserved for sections of a population deemed especially deficient and unable to exercise 
the responsibility of freedom’ (2005, 387). The owners of the Polochic sugarcane mill, 
for instance, called on the state to secure the rule of law when violently evicting 
hundreds of Q´eqchi´ families: ‘We bring employment and wealth; how are they going 
to progress with those little maize plants [maicitos]? Who else would be willing to 
invest US$ 50 million in this petty valley [vallecito de pipiripau]? Rule of law to protect 
investors is what is needed here’ (Guatevisión May 29, 2011). And rule of law was also 
what the CACIF called for when suing the mayor of Raxruha in court. However, even 
though the Constitution acknowledges constitutional hierarchy to international human 
rights treaties, such as the ILO convention number 169, or the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Constitutional Court does not recognize 
the outcomes of sixty-one “community consultations held in good faith” between May 
2005 and March 201234. Ruling by fiat also meant the fast-track approval by the 
Congress of eight new laws on investment protection and labor flexibility, as promoted 
by the CACIF in February 2013, while freezing the legal initiative on rural development 
 
34 In all of them, communitarians unanimously rejected different accumulation and development projects 
ongoing or planned in what they consider their territories. 
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agreed with “The March”. Furthermore, the government is using the 1965 counter-
insurgent “Decree 7 on Preventive States of Emergency” to deploy the military in 
villages where there are land control grab-related conflicts. National attorneys, for their 
part, deal with disruptive collective action through the Anti-terrorist Bill, and treat land 
occupations, for instance, as penal offenses of “aggravated usurpation of property”. This 
is leading to dozens of peasant leaders and organizers to be put in jail (interview with a 
member of the Maya Lawyers Association, Guatemala City, June 2013). This particular 
interpretation and enforcement of the law speaks for itself regarding whose interests 
prevail within core institutions of the Guatemalan state. 
In addition to state violence, private and parastatal violence is also part of the game. 
Public tracks are closed by the gates built by sugarcane and oil palm agribusinesses. It is 
common for the plots belonging to peasants and even to medium-scale ranchers, who 
refuse to sell or grow oil palm on their land, to end up being enclosed by plantations. 
Men refusing to sell their land are threatened by the companies’ private security staff 
who use ultimatums such as: ‘either you sell at the price we offer, or we will have to 
bargain with the widow instead’ (group meeting in a South Petén village, March 2008). 
Threats are sometimes carried out, and many have been assassinated or disappeared 
after refusing to sell their land, or when mobilizing in defense of territory35. Whatsmore, 
if resistance is one side of the survival coin, and compliance is the other, joining 
criminal gangs, private security forces or becoming a narco hit man are the survival 
coin’s edge of growing despair in the northern lowlands. Scott argued how ‘certain 
combinations of atomisation, terror, repression, and pressing material needs can, indeed, 
achieve the ultimate dream of domination: to have the dominated exploit each other’ 
(1986, 30). Or attack each other. This is the case when groups of generally poor, 
landless Q´eqchi´ men are hired to assault and/or evict their fellow resisters. 
Conclusion 
The current cycle of contention around the agrarian extractivist project in the 
Guatemalan countryside resembles previous cycles in many ways. For instance, the 
state persists as both a relevant means for, and an arena of, contestation. And many of 
the strategies, forms, and practices of contention in defense of territory, and in the 
promotion of the agrarian extractivist project, have been adapted from previous cycles 
of contention.  
Nonetheless, there are important ruptures with the past too, many of which have to do 
with the discussed dynamics around the labor regime fix, and the land good governance 
fix at play. Subsistence minimums are pushed to unprecedented thresholds. There are 
also new actors such as the financialized flex crop agribusinesses, small-scale oil palm 
outgrowers, new fragmented classes of rural labor, global land (good) governance 
institutions and NGOs, multi-stakeholder CSR certification schemes, radicalized 
 
35 It is difficult to give an exact figure because many resisters are attacked in moments and places other 
than those of direct confrontation. The Social Pastoral of Petén estimated in ‘dozens’ the number of 
resisters killed in Petén only between 2004 and 2009 (workshop in Petén, November 2009).       
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grassroots organizations, and so on, with a sharpened accumulation and governmental 
project, on one side, and with historically refined practices of resistance, on the other. 
There are, in short, analytical and political challenges ahead, in and around the emergent 
agrarian extractivist project. 
Framing resistance to agrarian extractivism as defense of territory offers the possibility 
to bridge “the best of both worlds” informing collective identities in the Guatemalan 
countryside, that is, community-accountable forms of governing land resources, as 
indigenous peoples, and low external input farming practices, as peasants. It also allows 
for grounding the vision of food sovereignty, while making of it both a fundamental 
means of struggle against the agrarian extractivist project and a vision informing a 
transformative life project. However, the defense of territory master frame also brings 
new challenges with regards to Borras’ and Franco’s differentiated political reactions 
“from below” to landgrabbing. First, a representational challenge: the unified bearer of 
collective rights enshrined within defense of territory, that is, the (indigenous-peasant) 
“community”, is subject to major social differentiation dynamics. Second, a targeting 
challenge: strengthening farming livelihoods and community command over land 
relations may provide the necessary means and meanings for resistance. But whether, 
and how, to engage with the state regulatory powers remain so far unresolved and 
central questions if such self-determined practices aim to have a future within a 
transformative project. And lastly, an alliance-building challenge: in scaling up 
resistance towards strategic litigation processes, there remains the hurdle of the 
knowledge dialogue between, across and within village authorities, grassroots 
collectivities, national militant peasant, indigenous and women movements’ 
organizations, and other allies in the academia, the media, the (I)NGO community, and 
the state.  
Efforts to assess the political dynamics of contemporary agrarian change in socio-
agroecological settings like the ones discussed here will benefit, thus, from engaging 
with the politics of the making of governable spaces to accommodate the agrarian 
extractivist project. In doing so, it is critical to examine the changing practices of, and 
relations between, across and within multiple corporate, state and social actors who are 
pushing for, resisting, complying with, or operating at the most violent margins of the 
agrarian extractivist project. Following this multiple politics perspective, then, it is 
worth stressing again that trajectories of agrarian change are not a story foretold, but the 
product of multiple and dynamic politics. 
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